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Abstract
Among the key justifications for protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs) is 
that they incentivise and reward human creativity and innovation. The incentive/
reward rationale is expected to foster a culture of innovation across jurisdictions 
and to provide sufficient motivation for further research and innovation. In this 
thematic report, the author explores the practical relevance of the incentive/reward 
justification for intellectual property (IP) protection in situations of employment. 
The author argues that in employment situations under Ghanaian law, the employer 
enjoys the economic benefits of the fruits of mental exertion to the detriment of 
the employee; the party actually engaged in the enterprise of creating IP materials 
receives insufficient incentives. This reality, the author argues, undermines the 
practical relevance of the core justification for IPRs protection.
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1. Introduction
One theoretical foundation for protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs) is 
that they provide incentive and reward for human ingenuity. In prosaic terms, the 
argument is that IPRs protection is a reward for creative and innovative work, and 
that without IP protection, fewer people would devote their efforts to intellectual 
activities, because they need the incentive and reward of the legal protection (Gervais 
& Judge, 2011, pp. 8-9). IPR theorists bolster this foundational justification with 
various linked proclamations, including: that the efforts that persons put into the 
creation of intellectual materials often demand enormous expertise, creativity and 
capital investment, which the law should endeavour to protect (Stiglitz, 2008, p. 
1695);1 that IPR protection promotes the transfer of technology and the creation 
of wealth; and/or that IPRs provide incentives for the advancement of local 
knowledge and innovation. The corollary is that the incentives to innovate and invest 
in high-risk research and development could suffer significant setbacks without a 
legal framework to secure creative endeavours. Accordingly, deliberate efforts have 
been made in both policy and academic discourse to craft or construe IP laws and 
regulations in a manner that advances this vision of a just and attractive creative 
culture (Fisher, 2001, p.10).
This thematic report explores the practical relevance of the incentive/reward 
justification for IPR protection in situations of employment in Ghana, and argues 
that there exists a wide chasm between the justification de jure (i.e., positive law 
justification) and the justification de facto (i.e., the real motivation to be creative and 
innovative) in situations of employment under Ghanaian law. The existing Ghanaian 
IP legal framework provides no real motivation for employees to create and innovate, 
and claims that sufficient incentive arises from the salaries paid to employees are 
untenable. The underlying juridical foundations for securing IPRs are undermined 
by inequities in the allocation of proprietary rights over knowledge goods created 
in the course of employment. The reality is that the prevailing modes for protecting 
IPRs in employment situations serve the needs of employers more than those of 
employees. The employer is fed the largest portion of the metaphorical carrot of 
incentive/reward, to the detriment of the employee who is actually engaged in the 
enterprise of creating intellectual assets, and thus deserves the largest share of the 
carrot. The result is an undermining of the foundational theoretical justification for 
protecting IPRs.
Section 2 briefly outlines the general and global theories advanced to rationalise 
the ideology of the IP system in Ghana. Theories such as the natural rights theory, 
the incentive/economic theory, the reward theory, and the disclosure/social contract 
theory have somewhat influenced the architecture of the intellectual property law 
order in Ghana. Section 3 provides the legal realities of IP ownership in situations
1  See also Diamond v Chakrabarty at 304.
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of employment under Ghanaian law, and makes suggestions as to how to make the 
incentive/reward justifications more tangible to employees engaged in creating IP 
in the course of employment. Section 4 discusses potential means by which benefit-
sharing can become more firmly established in Ghana in respect of IP generated by 
employees.
2. Basic rationales for IP rights protection
The rationale for protecting the fruits of mental exertion finds potent articulation 
in a number of theories propounded by scholars and policymakers (Fisher, 2001; 
Merges & Ginsburg, 2004). Theories proffered in defence of IP law systems include 
the natural rights theory, the reward theory, the incentive theory, and the contract/
disclosure of secret theory (see Adusei, 2013, pp. 111-129). These theories have 
cumulatively influenced the trajectory of the regimes of IPRs and their related 
jurisprudence in Ghana. 
For instance, the natural rights theory and reward theory played a crucial rhetorical 
role in the design of the copyright law of Ghana. The tenor of the protection of 
economic rights under the Copyright Act, 2005 (Act 690) reflects this reality: the law 
grants exclusive economic rights in respect of the exploitation of copyrightable works 
to the copyright-owner.2 It requires that the protection for the economic rights of the 
copyright-owner should subsist for the life of the author and 70 years after the death 
of the author.3 The Copyright Act of 2005 also grants authors perpetual protection of 
the moral rights of authorship and integrity in the work.4 For proponents of such an 
approach, “the labours of the mind and productions of the brain are as justly entitled 
to the benefit and emoluments that may arise from them, as the labours of the body 
are” (Smith, 2003, p. 103).
The incentive theory, which attempts to establish a causal relationship among IP 
incentives, inventiveness, and economic progress, has also found ardent articulation 
in Ghanaian IP law through a number of judicial decisions. In Copyright Society of 
Ghana v Afreh, the Court of Appeal in Ghana set out the underlying motivation to 
be creative in the following words: 
[…] public patronage of [intellectual property] work augurs well for the 
national economy and it is imperative that every effort be made to let this 
phenomenon serve as an incentive to authors […]. We must recognize 
that wherever there are adequate incentives there flourishes a healthy 
competition as a catalyst for economic growth of any country. (Copyright 
Society of Ghana v Afreh [1999-2000] 1 GLR 135 at 142-143)
2  See section 5 of Act 690.
3  Section 12 of Act 690.
4  Section 6 and 18 of Act 690.
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The Supreme Court of Ghana, in Pearson Education Ltd v Adzei, stated that “[the] 
law endeavours to strike a balance between protecting the economic rights of owners 
[…] and the need to encourage the free exchange and dissemination of ideas which 
is vital for the development and progress of any society” (Pearson Education Ltd 
v Adzei [2011] 2 SCGLR 864 at 867). The expectation, as captured in the 2003 
Memorandum to the Copyright Bill that led to Ghana’s 2005 Copyright Act, is that 
“the protection offered by the revision of [intellectual property] law will nurture and 
promote the creative talents of the citizenry and thus contribute to the development 
of this country” (Republic of Ghana, 2003b, at i). Following a similar logic, the 2013 
Memorandum to Ghana’s Plant Breeders’ Bill stated that the object of the proposed 
law was to “acknowledge the achievements of breeders of new varieties by making 
available to them an exclusive right on the basis of a set of uniform and clearly 
defined principles” (Republic of Ghana, 2013, at i.). It is thus envisaged that such 
legal safeguards will promote the growth of the seed industry and safeguard the 
lawful right and interest of plant breeders.
The belief, as articulated by Locke in his just deserts principle for physical property 
and extended by others to immaterial goods, is that, “every Man has a Property in 
his own person. The Labour of his body, and the Work of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his” (Locke, 1690, in Locke & Macpherson, 1980, para. 27, emphasis in 
original).5
The architecture of the regime of patents in Ghana is influenced by the disclosure/
social contract theory. The idea of this theory is that the grant of a patent right 
constitutes a bargain between the inventor/creator and the public, in which the 
creator obtains exclusive IPR protection for 20 years in exchange for giving the public 
information about the work. Under the Patents Act, 2003 (Act 657), this disclosure 
is expected to take place in the form of publication of the invention and the details 
of how it works in the course of the application process (sect. 5(5) of the Patents Act, 
2003). This theory also assumes that the information disclosed in return for the grant 
of an exclusive legal right is enough for the public to work the invention. As Amani 
(2009, p. 46) explains, “the disclosure essentially functions as
a ‘how-to’ guide providing information so that others are able to make and use the 
invention”.
5 The full text of Locke’s famous paragraph 27 of the Second Treatise reads: “Though the earth, and 
all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every Man has a Property in his own person: this 
nobody has a right to but himself. The Labour of his body, and the Work of his hands, we may 
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes then he takes out of the state that nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, 
and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath 
placed it in, it hath by this Labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of 
other men: for this Labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can 
have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in 
common for others” (emphasis in original).
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My focus in this exploration is on what I regard as the core justifications for IPRs 
in Ghanaian law: the incentive/reward theories. The point is that, of the many 
justifications available, the incentive/reward justifications are the predominant ones 
in policy and in judicial decisions in Ghana. The study then examines whether 
or not the workings of IP protection in employment situations in Ghana actually 
correspond to the theoretical incentive/reward rationale. 
3. IP in situations of employment in Ghana: Justifications and legal realities
As outlined above, a central argument in policy, legal and academic discourse is 
that the incentive/reward offered to IP owners serves as a morale booster of sorts, 
encouraging persons to apply their creative and innovative talents. It follows that 
without the “prize” under the legal system, IP, creative and innovative materials 
would not be made in abundance. 
This argument has, however, been undermined by studies that indicate that the IP 
system administered today is unable to ensure, in many instances, that the reward goes 
where it is most deserved (Penrose, 1973, p. 27). This is especially true in situations 
of employment, where the intellectual property rights are predominantly granted to 
employers-commissioners instead of the rights being granted to the persons actually 
employed to undertake the job. There is, thus, a wide chasm between the justification 
de jure (i.e., positive law justification) and the justification de facto (i.e., the real 
motivation to be creative) in situations of employment.
In the Ghanaian context, some of the relevant provisions in the country’s IP 
legislation deserve cooptation and analysis in extensor. Section 7 of the Ghana’s 
Copyright Act, 2005, broadly in line with the approach taken in copyright laws in 
many other countries, provides as follows:
Employed authors
In the absence of any contract to the contrary, the economic right of a work 
shall vest in an employer or a person who commissions the work where the 
employed or commissioned author has created the work in the course of 
employment or commission.
As Amegatcher (2013, p. 54) correctly points out, this standard provision unsettles 
the core principle in copyright law that the first owner of copyright is the person 
who created the work. In terms of this section 7 in Ghana’s Copyright Act, the 
basic rule is that the employer enjoys the economic benefits of the IP works created 
by the employee in the course of employment. The raison d’être for this exception 
in copyright is the assumption that the employer has paid remuneration to the 
employee, and as a result, the employer ought to benefit from the outcome of such 
expenditure. The law vests the economic interests in the employer-commissioner, 
and only the moral interests vest in the employee-author. The employer enjoys the 
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pecuniary benefits of the intellectual property material, while the employee retains 
the non-economic/moral interests. 
The only potential saving graces for the employee in section 7 are the specifications 
“in the absence of any contract to the contrary” and “in the course of employment or 
commission”. In the event of a dispute, the employer would have to provide evidence 
to establish that the work was created in the course of employment. In respect of the 
matter of a potential “contract to the contrary”, reliance has been made in judicial 
proceedings (see the English case Beloff v Pressdram [1973] 1 All E.R 241 ) on 
technicalities to distinguish between a contract of employment and a contract for 
employment. In Australia, in University of Western Australia v Gray [2009] FCAFC 
116, the phrase “in the course of employment” was interpreted strictly in favour of 
the employee to mean that the employment contract ought to expect the employee 
to invent before the employer can lay claim to the ownership of the IP materials. 
Thus, where the employer is able to provide credible evidence to the effect that the 
IP-generating work was created in the course of employment, the labourer will have 
arguably laboured in vain, except for the salaries earned.
In interpreting the section 7 “employed authors” provision in Ghana’s copyright law, 
Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J., in Musicians Union of Ghana v Abraham & Another, 
held that:
Where the work was made in the course of the author’s employment the 
copyright became vested in the author’s employer. The Plaintiffs who were 
mere employees of either the first defendant or T. Ltd, had no right assigned 
to them under the agreement between the defendants and thus they could 
not be owners of the copyrights of the work so as to control its release. 
Being mere employees, they were also not entitled to five percent of the fee 
payable to owners of the copyright of a musical work [...] and neither could 
any benefit be discerned in their favour from the contract between the two 
defendants so as to bring them under the Contracts Act, 1960 (Act 25). 
(Musicians Union of Ghana v Abraham & Another [1982-83] GLR 337 at 
338, emphasis added)
The facts on which the above decision was rendered were briefly as follows: the 
plaintiffs (musical band members) had been engaged to play for a band by the first 
defendant. During the existence of the employment relationship, the first defendant 
entered into an agreement with the second defendant, a recording company, granting 
that company the sole and exclusive right to make recordings of the performances of 
the band. The plaintiffs, claiming that the first defendant was their agent or manager, 
sought an order of interim injunction in the High Court to restrain the second 
defendant from (i) making any further releases of their recorded musical works, and 
(ii) making any further royalty payments to the first defendant. 
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The court, however, refused the application on the grounds that the plaintiffs were 
“mere employees” of the first defendant.
There are significant flaws inherent in granting the employer the economic benefits 
derived from IP materials created by employees in the course of employment. First, 
by presumptively vesting the economic rights in the employer, the law fails to fully 
appreciate the investments made by the employee in creating the intellectual work. 
This is especially so in the context of copyright, where no provision is made for 
returns that are much higher than anticipated – and when the employee is not 
sufficiently compensated by salary payments alone.
Second, the reality is that most employment contracts are either drafted by the 
employer or are standard-form contracts, and tend to contain provisions that 
priortise the interests of the employer, who is in the dominant position during 
contractual negotiations. A contract influenced by unequal bargaining positions 
will be generally unable to address the inequities inherent in vesting the pecuniary 
benefits of intellectual creations in the employer. Additionally, the low level of IP law 
consciousness in Ghana militates against the desire by persons to insist on express 
beneficial stipulations prior to their signing of an employment contract. 
Third, the treatment of employed creator under section 7 of the Copyright Act has 
the potential to trigger labour/post-labour disputes if an employee insists on the 
protection of his/her moral interests. In essence, the enjoyment of the moral interest 
may draw in the economic interests, thereby creating disputes, and vice versa. The 
relatively dominant employer’s interests stifle the somewhat docile moral interests of 
the employed author: the real labourer becomes a “mere employee” as adumbrated 
in the above-cited case. In Ransome-Kuti v Phonogram Ltd [1976] 1 GLR 220, the 
High Court found that the moral rights of the author are merely secondary. 
A reported example of a dispute that turned on the tension between the economic 
and moral IP rights of creators working in employment situations occurred in 2006 
between Elizabeth Ohene (a well-known Ghanaian journalist) and the Graphic 
Communications Group Ltd (GCGL). The Plaintiff, GCGL, sued Ohene, a former 
employee and a former editor of the Daily Graphic, for infringement of the company’s 
copyright. GCGL asked the High Court for an injunction to restrain Ohene from 
incorporating – in her books – articles, editorials and news items published by Ohene 
in the Daily Graphic. The gravamen (i.e., essence) of GCGL’s case was that even 
though Ohene wrote the articles and participated in the writing of the editorials, she 
did so as an employee, for which her services were paid. The parties eventually settled 
the matter amicably and the case did not go to trial, with the GCGL Board deciding 
that having regard to the unique role played by Ohene at a critical time in the history 
of the Daily Graphic and Ghana, she should be granted permission to use the said
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materials for the publication of her two books, namely Thinking Allowed and Stand 
Up and Be Counted (Amegatcher, 2013, p. 56).
Turning to the patent sphere, the analogous provision in Ghana’s Patents Act, 
section 4, is significantly more favourable to employees than what is contained in the 
Copyright Act. While section 4(5) provides that “[w]here an invention is made in 
execution of an employment contract, the right to the patent belongs in the absence 
of any contractual provisions to the contrary, to the employer,” section 4(6) takes it a 
step further by providing that:
Where the invention has an economic value much greater than the parties 
could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
the inventor shall be entitled to a special remuneration, which shall be fixed 
by the court in the absence of an agreement between the parties. 
The Patents Act thus provides avenues for the sharing of the benefits of IP works 
created in the course of employment. Such a provision is, to my knowledge, unique 
across the common law world. With this benefit-sharing provision, employees can 
be assured that where the IP benefits of their labours are substantial, not all of the 
benefits will go to the employer alone. In the context of copyright, no provision is 
made for situations where the returns are much higher than anticipated – and at least 
in situations when the employee is not sufficiently compensated by salary payments 
alone.
It is my view that this unique benefit-sharing approach contained in the Patents 
Act should be accorded to all manner of intellectual assets created in the course of 
employment in Ghana. Furthermore, the benefit-sharing should not be limited by 
the law to inventions of high economic value, i.e., it should not be limited to cases 
where the employee-created IP has, as the Patents Act puts it, “an economic value 
much greater than the parties could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract”. It is submitted that the benefit-sharing should apply to 
all benefits, regardless of their economic value.
A regime of IP protection that takes due account of the labour of an employee in the 
distribution of the benefits derived from the IP would better serve as an incentive 
than the present regime that treats the employee as a “mere employee”. At present, 
the law’s inability – particularly in the case of the Copyright Act, and to a lesser 
degree in the Patents Act – to take due account of the IP interests of employees 
undermines the practical relevance of the incentive/reward justifications that are 
much-trumpeted in IP policy and in legal discourses.
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I now turn to an examination of the ways in which benefit-sharing could become
more firmly established in Ghana in respect of IP generated by persons in the course 
of employment.
4. Benefit-sharing modalities 
Contracts
One option for attaining a fair allocation of benefits accruing from IP works created 
in the course of employment is through the adoption of enforceable contracts. 
Such express arrangements take away the discretion that the law accords to judges, 
in the course of judicial proceedings, in interpreting the phrase “in the course of 
employment” or “in the course of the commission”, or, in the case of the Patents Act, 
“an economic value much greater than the parties could have reasonably foreseen at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract”. There is a need to sensitise the public 
about the position of the law with regard to the ownership of IP works created in 
the course of employment. Such sensitisation would potentially generate insistence 
by prospective employees on express IP benefit-sharing terms as part of their 
employment contracts. 
Institutional policies
To obviate the challenge of finding a solution after a conflict has arisen, the University 
of Ghana developed and adopted its Intellectual Property Policy of 2015.6 This Policy 
serves as the guiding contract between the University and its employees/students, 
and it also applies to visiting academics and visiting students at the University (in 
the absence of any contract to the contrary). The Policy attempts to define benefit-
sharing approaches that would satisfy the needs of both the University and its IP-
creating researchers (employees and students).
Paragraph 4.1 of the Policy allows employees to own IP works created without a 
significant use of the University’s resources. Conversely, the University holds the 
rights over IP works created in the course of employment and with significant use 
of the University’s resources. A “significant use of University resources” is defined to 
include the use of University-administered funds, University facilities, equipment, 
resources, time, office space, personnel, and administrative support. In the particular 
instance of inventions – which are commercialised through the University’s Office 
of Research, Innovation and Development (ORID) – the Policy provides the 
following formula for sharing royalties that may accrue from such inventions: 40% 
to the inventor, 25% to the University, 15% for the support of research grants or 
fellowships, 10% to the inventor’s College and its constituents, and the remaining
6 See University of Ghana (2015). Unlike countries such as South Africa, Ghana has no special 
arrangements in regard to the sharing of benefits from publicly funded research. In the absence of 
any contract to the contrary, the laws of Ghana treat all institutions equally in regard to IP works 
created in the course of employment.
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10% to an Intellectual Property Fund to be established in support of IP protection, 
marketing and commercialisation activities.7
Legislation
As explained above, potential employees in Ghana are typically not in a position 
favourable to negotiation of the IP terms of their employment contracts. And the 
University of Ghana IP Policy only applies to a single, albeit important, institution. 
Given these limitations with the first two benefit-sharing approaches discussed – 
contracts and institutional policies – the ideal situation would be to have national 
legislative amendments to codify benefit-sharing from IP created in the course of 
employment. Such legislative amendments, and amendments to accompanying 
regulations, would need to be based on due consideration of both economic and 
moral rights, would need to provide a formula for recognising both employer and 
employee contributions to IP, and for sharing of the benefits. Such legislation would 
also need to contain provisions for non-adversarial mechanisms of dispute resolution, 
so as to minimise labour disputes and to preserve healthy working relationships 
between employers and employees.
5. Conclusions
This thematic report has shown that the incentive/reward justifications commonly 
advanced for protecting intellectual assets in Ghana are not – outside of specific 
contexts such as the University of Ghana – given practical effect in terms of accrual 
of benefits from IP created by employees. To reverse this trend, there is a need to 
sensitise the public about the position of the law with regard to the ownership of 
IP works created in the course of employment. Such sensitisation would potentially 
generate insistence by prospective employees on express IP benefit-sharing terms 
as part of their employment contracts. And at a more fundamental level, because of 
the inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees, consideration 
needs to be given to legislative amendments requiring the establishment of regulatory 
formulas and procedures for fair sharing, between employers and employees, of 
benefits from all IP created in the course of employment. The use of legislation, 
and accompanying regulations, to correct the imbalances would ensure that 
the justification de jure translates into justification de facto in spurring on human 
creativity in situations of employment. For now, the incentive/reward justifications 
have theoretical importance only.
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